The relations between different levels of government in Argentina by Cetrángolo, Oscar & Jiménez, Juan Pablo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA • OSCAR CETRÁNGOLO AND JUAN PABLO JIMÉNEZ
115
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
The relations between
different levels
of government in Argentina
Oscar Cetrángolo and Juan Pablo Jiménez
This article deals with the fiscal and financial relations between the
national government and the provincial governments in Argentina during
the last 15 years, identifying the factors which help to explain the high
degree of conflictivity of those relations. In view of the institutional roots
of the conflict, a historical review is made in order to place the recent
problems and future discussion in a long-term context. First of all, the
development of federalism in Argentina and the evolution of the various
forms of autonomy of the provinces is examined, followed, in the central
section of the document, by a review of the options that have dominated
the changes in the functions and incomes of the different levels of
government in recent decades. Those options have to do not only with
the distribution of taxes but also with the process of decentralization and
the changes in functions among levels of government.
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It is well known that the benefits of a modern federal
system of government are linked with the effective
functioning of the democratic institutions. In Argenti-
na, however, since those institutions came into effect
again in 1983 the debate has centered almost
exclusively on the possibility of approving a new
system of distribution of taxes, and little progress has
been made in the analysis of a more mature form of
fiscal federalism which would provide a better quality
of life all over the country. Still worse, it has not even
been possible to achieve a stable system of distribution
of taxes. Ten years ago, a Constituent Assembly agreed
on the need for a new system, but it has never been
possible to reach a consensus on this matter. Transitory
pacts, bilateral agreements (often secret) and mutual
mistrust have taken the place of the transparent and
stable rules, confidence and complementarity needed
in a modern federal system prizing consensus above
conflict.
The recent crisis and the decisions taken to cope
with it undoubtedly involve a change in the relations
between levels of government which affects both the
distribution of resources and income and the allocation
of functions and indebtedness of each of those levels.
It has therefore become necessary to rethink the
problem, seeking the roots of the reasons for past
difficulties and the key to the construction of a more
stable system under the new circumstances.
This article analyses the conflictive financial
relationship between the national government and the
provinces over the last 15 years in order to identify the
factors that can explain the difficulty in generating a
stable system of relations between the two levels: a
system of which the Co-participation Law is only a
part. In view of the institutional roots of this problem,
a long-term historical review must be made in order
to place the recent problems and the future discussion
in a suitable context.
In line with this idea, the following section
presents the historical roots of the conflict between
the different levels of government, analysing the
process of development of the federal State as a
limitation on the autonomy of the provinces and the
special history of tax distribution systems in Argen-
tina. Subsequently, the central part of the document
examines the relations between the different levels of
government over the last 15 years, with regard to both
functions and resources. That section goes into greater
detail not only on the options for the distribution of
taxes but also those regarding the process of
decentralization and change of functions among the
different levels of government.
II
The allocation of functions among
levels of government
Argentina, like the United States, Switzerland and
Australia, belongs to the group of countries whose
Constitutions define the respective federal and
concurrent powers, leaving all the residual powers not
elsewhere specified in the hands of the provincial
governments. Thus the National Constitution of Argen-
tina lays down that the provinces shall keep for
themselves all those areas of competence not allocated
to the federal government. As Bidart Campos (1993)
notes, this indicates that for the provinces competence
in any given matter is the rule, while for the federal
government it is the exception. The federal government
has exclusive responsibility for external relations,
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money issue, internal and external navigation, and
defence. Competence is shared, however, in a number
of areas such as the administration of justice, primary
education and social security. Consequently, the
constitutional framework is not very clear as regards
the functions and responsibilities of each level of
government, and this has made possible various
process of reallocation of functions in recent decades.
These processes, which have not always been very
orderly and transparent, have made the relations
between the national government, the provinces and the
municipalities even more complex.
The National Constitution delegates to each
province the definition of its own municipal system.
The Constitutions of the various provinces and the
organic municipal laws establish different areas of
competence for the municipalities, but in practice these
differences have diminished. The main actions and
policies of the local governments are connected
fundamentally with basic urban services such as
garbage collection services and public lighting.
1. Public expenditure and its allocation among
the different levels of government
The lack of a clear division of responsibilities for
expenditure among the various levels of government
is usually the main source of conflict among them, as
well as leading to inefficient and unequal use of
resources. Whereas some functions (such as defence)
cause little discussion about the level of government
that should provide them, others, such as education and
health, have given rise to different ways of dealing with
them in different countries over the last few years.
Quite apart from the usual recommendation that
overlapping of functions should be avoided, most often
the various responsibilities of the public sector are
shared among the different levels of government.
Unlike other countries, in Argentina the processes
of devolving or decentralizing expenditure to the
subnational levels of government cannot be viewed as
an advance by those levels compared with the powers
of the central government. Although on the one hand
it may be noted that with each new legislative instance
the coefficients of distribution in favour of the provin-
cial governments have increased, on the other hand the
processes of decentralization of expenditure, since they
have not been accompanied by concomitant changes
in the resources made available, have involved strong
(military or civil) central governments and unequal
negotiating power.
As also occurred towards the end of the 1970s,
the process of fiscal decentralization which prevailed
in the educational and health reforms of the early 1990s
were exclusively motivated by the national
government’s decision to modify the financial relations
with the provinces and municipalities in its own favour.
Both the transfer of health and primary educational
establishments in the first of the above-mentioned
decades and that of hospitals and secondary schools in
the early part of the latter decade were explicitly
motivated by the desire to modify effective co-
participation. Furthermore, no specific resources were
envisaged to cover the financing of decentralized
services, nor were any compensatory mechanisms
designed before the transfers.
The decentralization policy has resulted in heavy
costs in terms of “social cohesion”. In the fields of both
health and education, a wide range of local responses
can be identified as regards the way the process has
been adopted and its results in terms of equity and
efficiency. The lack of coordination from the central
level has permitted great heterogeneity of the forms of
conduct at the provincial and municipal levels,
depending largely on the prior configuration of each
system and the sectoral policy adopted in each locality
in response to the decentralization process. These
responses are also strongly conditioned by the financial
constraints, which affect each local area in very
different ways. Thus, the possibilities of improving the
decentralized social services are delimited by the
degree of socioeconomic and productive development
in each subnational area of jurisdiction and its financial
capacity. Likewise, the development potential of each
such jurisdiction is determined to a large extent by the
state and level of its human and cultural capital, which
is directly linked with its population’s possibilities of
gaining access to good levels of education and health.
There are no special fiscal and financial
mechanisms associated with the distribution of fiscal
revenue between the central government and the
provinces which can be equated with national standards
in terms of the provision and quality of education or
health. Under the present policy design, this raises a
difficult dilemma: if it is desired to apply nationwide
programmes or policies and priorities, aimed at more
equitable provision of education and health in the
different provinces of the country, this will eventually
call for additional funds from the national budget, but
if this option is not viable from the fiscal point of view,
this will adversely affect any actions to secure such
improvement. As a result, the provision and quality of
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education and health will tend to depend too much on
the availability of economic and fiscal resources in the
different jurisdictions in question.
Moreover, the decentralization of social services
has led to changes in the way these fiscal constraints
are manifested. Since the structure of expenditure of
the provinces has come to be increasingly dominated
by social services, the efforts to put their finances on
a sounder basis undertaken by the different provincial
jurisdictions which have been faced with fiscal and
financial problems necessarily had to consider the
possibility of reducing their health and education
outlays. Furthermore, since almost all of the
expenditure in these fields is concentrated on the
payment of salaries, in some provinces these efforts
have given rise to episodes of serious social conflict.
In order to deal with these problems, attempts have
therefore been made to apply reforms in the health and
education sectors aimed at improving the organization
and management of social expenditure.
As a result of the processes of change in the
country’s fiscal structure, the national government has
increasingly centered its outlays on social security,
health services for the elderly, and debt service. The
provinces, for their part, have done so in the fields of
education and health, while the municipalities have
concentrated on different urban services. Simplifying the
problem to the extreme, it could be said that the national
government has concentrated its budget on dealing with
problems of the past (usually established rights which
it is difficult to alter), while the provinces have
concentrated their efforts on the future. Indeed, the
national government has used the financial needs of the
pension system as an argument to put pressure on the
provincial governments to agree to give up resources to
ensure the financing of the social security system. As a
result, both the provinces and the municipalities are now
co-financing that system. In order to illustrate this point,
figure 1 shows the level and composition of the
expenditure of the different levels of government for the
years 2000 and 2002 (i.e., before and after the end of
the convertibility programme). This figure confirms the
above-mentioned characteristics of the functional
structure of expenditure by levels of government.
FIGURE 1
Argentina: Composition of public expenditure by function
















































Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Ministry of Economic Policy.
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2. Allocation of taxation powers, and financial
imbalance between the different levels of
government
With regard to the financing of the different levels of
government, the National Constitution (article 75,
paragraph 2) delimits the taxation powers of the national
government and the provinces, laying down that indirect
taxes shall be concurrent between both levels, except in
the case of import and export duties, which are an
exclusive prerogative of the national government (article
4). In principle, direct taxes are exclusively provincial,
but the national government has the right to use them
for a limited time if defence, common security and the
general good of the State so require.
In practice, most taxes are collected by the
national government and the provinces share in them.
The provinces, however, collect four important taxes
themselves (on real estate, motor vehicles, stamps and
gross income) which cover some 40% of their
expenditure; the rest is financed through transfers from
the central government and indebtedness.
In this sense, Argentina is no exception to
international trends: the share of the subnational levels
of government in total resources has not grown
commensurately with their expenditure, thus leading to
a growing gap between expenditure and resources at
the subnational level.
For reasons of efficiency, the literature usually
recommends that subnational levels of government
should not use taxes whose bases are highly mobile and
subject to major cyclical variations. This clearly limits
the decentralization of income tax, whether on persons
or companies. In the case of consumption taxes, tax
administration considerations (economies of scale in
collection and difficulties regarding trade between
different areas of jurisdiction) likewise make their
decentralization inadvisable. Wealth taxes are free from
all these problems, but they usually generate amounts
of revenue which are insufficient for financing the
outlays of subnational levels of government in heavily
decentralized countries.
The allocation of taxes between the different
levels of government has to strike a balance between
two sometimes opposing objectives. On the one hand,
the theory of fiscal federalism holds that the
subnational levels of government can better respond to
the preferences of the inhabitants in those areas where
local taxes can internalize the cost of the provision of
a given amount of goods and services by the local
government.
On the other hand, there are various reasons why
it is difficult to give national governments sufficient
powers of taxation to finance the growing provision of
goods and services by those governments.
Consequently, although it is agreed in theory that there
should be a certain degree of symmetry between
responsibilities for expenditure and taxation powers, in
practice there are few taxes that can be decentralized
without a serious loss of efficiency and equity.
This trade-off between two sometimes opposing
objectives can be mitigated by suitable tax coordination
between levels of government. Furthermore, a properly
designed system of transfers which lays down explicit
objectives and provides suitable incentives can offset
the habitual difficulty of subnational tax systems in
financing the responsibilities assigned to them.
Nevertheless, as we shall see in following sections, this
task can come up against many obstacles.
Taking a long-term view, it may also be noted that
this inter-jurisdictional financial imbalance must also
be considered as an element which has made the
relations between the national government and the
provinces even more conflictive. As may be seen from
figure 2, the imbalances between the expenditure
structures and tax and non-tax resources of the
jurisdictional areas were only very slight up to the
1980s.1 Since then, however, the increased concentration
of resources administered by the national government
and the decentralization of outlays have given rise to
heavy pressure on the tax revenue distribution systems
because the national government accounts for three-
quarters of the resources but only about half the
consolidated outlays. Before the decentralization of
schools and hospitals in the late 1970s, the national
government collected and spent fairly similar
proportions of the total.
Finally, it is considered important, in order to
complete the analysis of sources of financing, to take
into account the degree of autonomy of the provinces
and the availability of tax resources of their own, and
1 Unfortunately, it is no easy task to reconstruct long-term fiscal
statistics in Argentina. In preparing figure 2 we used several
publications of the Ministry of Finance, which have presented the
information according to various different methodologies over time.
In this case, we tried to transform the data in accordance with one
homogeneous method and we selected the years in the light not
only of the changes in the levels of decentralization of resources
and outlays but also of the availability of the information. The
resources considered include not only tax resources but also non-
tax revenue (rates and charges for services provided), in order to
give a better idea of municipal financing.
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FIGURE 2
Argentina: Percentage structure of resources (tax and non-tax)
and outlays, by level of governmenta
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance.
a The resources correspond to the tax and non-tax resources administered by each level of government. The outlays are classified according
to the level of government which made them. In the case of public enterprises, interest payment and the primary deficit were also considered
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to briefly consider their differences in productive
capacity, the dynamics of their real economies, and
some specific economic development problems of the
different jurisdictional areas.
Recent studies suggest that the convergence of per
capita income among the countries of the European
Union has not been accompanied by a similar
convergence within the subnational jurisdictions. On
the contrary, the differences in per capita income
between those areas has increased in Italy, Germany
and France (Decressin, 1999). A similar finding is
made in respect of Latin America by Silva (2003).
However, it must be borne in mind that the size of such
disparities varies considerably from one country to
another. Thus, in Argentina the per capita income of
the province of Santa Cruz (the richest in this respect)
is 8.6 times that of Formosa (the poorest); in Brazil,
the per capita income of the Federal District is 7.2 ti-
mes that of the state of Maranhão; in Mexico it is 6.2
times higher in the Federal District than in Chiapas,
but in Canada the per capita income of the richest state
is only 1.7 times that of the poorest. These big
disparities in subnational terms not only affect the
design of equalization schemes, but also place a limit
on certain decentralization exercises. They are also
reflected in different tax bases for financing a given
supply of goods and services by the subnational public
sectors, as well as in different capacities of the
government apparatus. All this helps to emphasize the
importance of the mechanisms for transfers to the
subnational levels of government, which will be dealt
with in the following section.
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III
The federal fiscal structure in Argentina
and co-participation in tax revenue: historical
roots of the conflicts and areas of consensus
between the different levels of government
The system of co-participation in taxes began in
1935, with the adoption of laws designed to increase
the amount of resources collected by the national
government in order to cope with the financial
difficulties caused by the fall in revenue from foreign
trade during the 1930s crisis.
Subsequently, in the 1950s, the system of co-
participation which remained in effect until 1973 was
developed. This was characterized by the application
of various laws which laid down the distribution of the
different taxes and defined three different mechanisms
for their distribution. It was only from 1973 onwards
that the co-participation system was governed by a
single law: Law No. 20.221. The system laid down in
this law was novel in two ways: it involved a single
system of distribution of the taxes subject to co-
participation, and it laid down secondary distribution
coefficients in which redistributive concerns were
given some importance. These features made this
system an obligatory point of reference every time new
tax distribution arrangements are discussed.
Later, the macro-fiscal crisis of the early 1980s
caused serious financial problems for the provincial
governments. With new democratic governments at
both the national and provincial levels, the conflict
between the two levels reached such a point that, when
the period of validity of Law No. 20.221 came to an
end, it was not possible to agree on a new system of
distribution for the next three years (between 1985 and
1987), and it was only in the last of these years, after
the defeat of the national governing party at the polls,
that it was possible to negotiate a temporary system
(Law No. 23.548) which is still in force today, albeit
with many amendments.
2. Systems of distribution in the long term
Generally speaking, the long-term evolution of the
systems of co-participation in the taxes collected by the
national government was marked by three simultaneous
1. Historical roots of the conflicts between
jurisdictions
For a long time after Independence, there was tension
in Argentina between the two predominant tendencies
in the efforts to constitute a State (a confederation of
independent provinces and a federation with leadership
at the national level), which was reflected in a series of
pacts and agreements.2 Only in the second half of the
nineteenth century was it decided, with the 1853
Constitution, to adopt a federal form of government with
leadership at the national level. The tension over the
autonomy of the provinces continued, however (Bota-
na, 1993). Since 1935, the relations between the national
government and the provinces have mainly concerned
the distribution of tax resources, with few efforts to
coordinate expenditure and indebtedness. In this section
we will deal specifically with the distribution of revenue
and the systems of co-participation in taxes.
The disputes about co-participation in taxes are
usually identified with conflicts about the financing of
the activities of the different levels of government. The
history of co-participation systems only reflects the third
(and undoubtedly the best known) of the stages through
which these disputes passed. Before, from the middle
of the nineteenth century up to 1890, the tax sources
of the different levels of government were clearly
defined: the resources of the national government came
basically from foreign trade, while the provinces relied
on taxes on the production and consumption of specific
goods. Later, between 1890 and 1935, with the creation
of national consumption taxes which were
superimposed on those levied by the provinces, there
was a second stage, that of “de facto concurrency”.3
2 The Federal Pact of 1831 was a clear expression of the desire for
a confederation.
3 For more details in this respect, see Porto (1990), Presman (1992)
and Cetrángolo and Jiménez (1998).
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trends: the increase in the number of sub-national
jurisdictions included; the growing incorporation of
national taxes in the total amount of resources to be
shared, and the increase in the primary distribution
coefficient.4
The first of these trends is shown in table 1, in
which it can be seen that of the 24 provincial
jurisdictions which now exist (including the city of
Buenos Aires), only 14 had participated in the
formation of the federal State. These were provinces
which had formed part of one or another of the areas
of government into which the Kingdom of Spain had
organized the territory of what is now the Argentine
Republic, so they were all prior to 1853 and, of course,
to the adoption of the first tax distribution laws,
towards the mid-1930s.
The remainder of the current provinces
correspond to the so-called National Territories
(previously under the jurisdiction of the Buenos Aires
authorities), thus forming a unitary country entirely
organized on the federal system but of enormous area
(especially after the “Conquest of the Desert” in the
1880s), with nine sub-national governments coming
under the central authorities.5 Table 1 also shows the
relative weight, in terms of population and the
generation of wealth, achieved by these territories
which were of little importance in these two respects
150 years ago. The provinces created during the 1950s,
plus Tierra del Fuego, now account for rather more
than 12% of the total population of the country and
generate a similar proportion of the total GDP. The city
of Buenos Aires, which was declared autonomous in
1994, belonged to the province of the same name in
the mid-nineteenth century.
Table 1 also provides a striking picture of one of
the outstanding features of the federal system and the
economy in Argentina: the heavy concentration of
wealth in a very few jurisdictions. The origins of the
conflict between the “Port” and the interior of the
country continue to be reflected, with a few variations,
in an economy where 60% of the product is
concentrated in only two jurisdictions (the City and
Province of Buenos Aires), while 80% is concentrated
in only five jurisdictions (the previous two plus Cór-
doba, Santa Fe and Mendoza). At the other extreme,
TABLE 1
Argentina: Year of creation and relative
importance of the provinces of Argentina
Jurisdiction Year of Population Economic
creation  structure structure
(% of population (% of GDP
in 2001) in 2002)
Created before 1853
Buenos Aires 1820 38.1 32.7
Catamarca 1821 0.9 1.1
Cordoba 1820 8.5 8.1
Corrientes 1821 2.6 1.2
Entre Rios 1821 3.2 2.1
Jujuy 1834 1.7 0.8
La Rioja 1820 0.8 0.5
Mendoza 1820 4.4 3.9
Salta 1821 3.0 1.6
San Juan 1820 1.7 0.8
San Luis 1820 1.0 1.0
Santa Fe 1815 8.3 8.1
Santiago del Estero 1820 2.2 0.9
Tucuman 1821 3.7 1.8
Subtotal  80.0 64.6
Created in the 1950s
Chaco 1951 2.7 1.2
Chubut 1955 1.1 2.1
Formosa 1955 1.3 0.5
La Pampa 1951 0.8 1.0
Misiones 1953 2.7 1.2
Neuquen 1955 1.3 2.9
Rio Negro 1955 1.5 1.4
Santa Cruz 1955 0.5 1.8
Subtotal 12.1 12.0
Created in the 1990s
City of 1994 7.7 22.7
  Buenos Aires
Tierra del Fuego 1990 0.3 0.7
Subtotal 7.9  23.4
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from
the Federal Investment Council (1996), the National Institute of
Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) and the ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires.
4 An exception to this trend was the 1967 reform, in which the
primary distribution coefficient was reduced.
5 At that time, a portion of the provinces of Salta and Jujuy also
formed part of a National Territory, the Territorio de Los Andes.
See Botana (1993), p. 241.
nine provinces with less developed production
structures do not even account for 7% of GDP together.6
The second of these trends may be seen in table 2,
which shows the transition from a primitive, fragmented
system involving only three of the taxes collected by
the national government to a unified set of systems
6 According to estimates made by the ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires
for the Panorama Económico Provincial, which is available on the
web site of that office. For more information, see Gatto and
Cetrángolo (2003).
C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 4  •   D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 4
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IN ARGENTINA • OSCAR CETRÁNGOLO AND JUAN PABLO JIMÉNEZ
123
seeking to put order in the distribution of almost all
the taxes collected by the General Department of Taxes
(DGI). Figure 3, for its part, shows the relative
importance of the taxes incorporated into the total
amount subject to co-participation.
With regard to the third of the above trends, table 3
shows the evolution of the distribution coefficients
between 1935 and 1988. Up to 1972 the information
shown corresponds to only one of the co-participation
systems that were operating at the same time, because
TABLE 2
Argentina: Incorporation of taxes into the co-participation system
Year Law Taxes incorporated
1935 12 139 Internal taxes.
12 143 Sales taxes.
12 147 Income taxes.
1946 12 956 On windfall profits.
1951 14 060 Tax on the transfer of assets without payment.
1973 20 221 Taxes on land fit for agricultural use, regularization of net worth, foreign exchange, motor vehicles, real estate,
lubricants, plus any taxes established as indirect taxes by the national government in the future. Will also
include taxes levied for a specific purpose, once the objective of their application has been fulfilled.
1988 23 548 All existing or future national taxes, with the exception of: i) import and export duties; ii) taxes whose distribution
is dealt with in other systems; iii) those established for a specific purpose and already in effect when this law
was adopted. Once the purpose of their creation has been fulfilled, however, they will be incorporated into the
system.
Source: Cetrángolo and Jiménez (1998).
FIGURE 3














Subject to co-participation On external trade On payroll Others
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance and Cetrángolo and Jiménez (1995).
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TABLE 3
Argentina: Evolution of primary distribution
coefficients up to 1973a and Federal
Co-participation System since then
(Percentages)




12.143 y 12.147 1935-1946 82.5 17.5
12.956 1947-1958 79.0 21.0








20.221 1973-1980 46.7 53.3b
1981-1984c 48.5 51.5d
23.548 1988 42.34 57.66e
Source: Cetrángolo and Jiménez (1998), on the basis of the
legislation.
a System according to Law No. 12.143 and Law No. 12.147 (and
amendments).
b Includes 1.8% for the municipality of the City of Buenos Aires,
financed by the national government and the Regional
Development Fund.
c A deduction was made from the co-participation funds for the
benefit of the social security system.
d Includes the Regional Development Fund.
e Includes contributions from the National Treasury.
and the evolution of the other systems of allocation of
taxes for specific purposes.
3. The federal tax co-participation system over
the last 15 years
The 1980s began with the failure of the attempt to build
a solid but dynamic system of co-participation in tax
resources and ended with the approval of a new system
which was described as provisional from its inception.
Thus, towards the end of 1987 Law No. 23.548 was
adopted, providing for a transitory system of
distribution of tax resources between the national
government and the provinces.
The new system involved substantial changes in
the primary distribution of tax resources (between the
national government and the provinces) and the
secondary distribution (among the provinces). In the
first case, the provinces obtained a bigger share in the
distribution of funds, because the percentage
distributed to the provinces was the highest since 1935
(when the first co-participation system was adopted)
and the list of taxes included in the amount of resources
subject to co-participation was expanded, extending
even to taxes that might be established after the
approval of the law in question.
With regard to the secondary distribution, the
main difference from the previous system (Law
No. 20.221, in force from 1973 to 1984) is the
elimination of all explicit criteria for determining the
distribution coefficients. In the previous system, the
distribution was determined through a combination of
clearly defined criteria (population, development gap,
dispersal of population). In contrast, under Law No.
23.548 the coefficients are based on the distributions
effectively carried out between 1985 and 1987, when
there were no rules governing co-participation and
—even more important— when distribution was
effected according to the needs of each jurisdiction and
the bargaining power of its government and legislators,
although the distribution inherited from Law No.
20.221 was taken as a basis.7
Since Law No. 23.548 came into force, the
evolution of tax revenue has been strongly influenced
the others did not operate with fixed coefficients. This
table clearly shows the growth in the provinces’
participation in the primary distribution of resources
subject to co-participation over time, except in the
period from 1967 to 1972, when the Parliament was
not functioning.
An analysis of the share of resources for the
provinces within the total tax revenue collected by the
national government does not show an upward trend
since 1935, however, as the above two long-term trends
(the growing incorporation of taxes in the amount
subject to co-participation and the increase in the
primary distribution coefficients) would suggest. On
the contrary, this evolution has been erratic.
The causes of this phenomenon are to be sought
in the great changes that have taken place in the
structure and level of taxation in Argentina over time.
The development of the social security system has
undoubtedly been one of these causes, together with
the cyclical fluctuations in tax pressure on foreign trade
7 Over time, the different systems have increasingly been
incorporating redistributive criteria at the level of the secondary
distribution, to the detriment of criteria at the primary level.
Consequently, the shares of the jurisdictions with the greatest tax
collection capacity have been losing relative importance. This subject
was dealt with in detail in Cetrángolo and Jiménez (1995).
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by the way the global economic situation has evolved.
In the first half of the 1990s there was considerable
simplification of the structure of the resources subject
to co-participation, but this situation was partially
reversed from the middle of the decade on, when new
emergency taxes had to be introduced in order to cope
with successive episodes of macro-fiscal crisis.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of revenue in the
1990s. It may be seen that the tax burden was relatively
constant between 1992 and 2002 (a period in which tax
changes and the introduction of new taxes barely
managed to keep up the level of the total burden), but
there was a spectacular increase in 2003. This evolution
also reflects changes in the tax structure due to an
initial trend towards simplification of the system, with
relative growth of revenue from the value added tax
(IVA)8 and, to a lesser extent, profits tax.9 Subsequently,
in the second half of the decade, there was a sharp fall
in revenue from payroll taxes.
In contrast with this trend, the system of distribution
of tax revenue has reached a level of complexity and
fragility almost unparalleled in any other period of
Argentine history. As we will see, the concentration of
revenue in taxes which are subject to co-participation
by current law has led to a struggle for the allocation
of these funds and a search for ways of getting round
the law. Since 1996, the increase in the revenue subject
to co-participation under Law No. 23.548 has not been
reflected in an increase in transfers to the provinces but
has been used to offset the loss of resources from
payroll taxes that should have gone to the central
government.
To sum up, the main features of transfers to the
provinces in the 1990s were as follows: a sharp rise in
the early years of the decade; a simultaneous increase
in the proportion of specific allocations in the total
transfers to the provinces, to the detriment of co-
participation; stagnation of the total amount of transfers
since 1992, regardless of changes in the total amount
collected, and —partly related with this— the
replacement of payroll taxes with taxes collected by the
General Tax Directorate in the financing of the national
government’s needs.
The struggle for resources between the different
areas of the national and provincial public sectors was
so great that there are now almost no taxes which are
not allocated, at least in part, for some specific purpose.
In response to these pressures, the national authorities
FIGURE 4





















Income, profits and capital gains
Wealth
Foreign trade and international transactions
Wage and social security contributions
Other tax resources
Provincial resourcesInternal taxes on goods, services and transactions
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance and the ECLAC Office in Buenos Aires.
8 Included in internal taxes on goods, services and transactions.
9 Included in the taxes on income, profits and capital gains.
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negotiated specific allocations (especially for the so-
cial security system) to cover expenses that would
otherwise have had to be paid by the National Treasury
or transferred expenditures to other levels of
government (schools and hospitals, for example). The
result was a change in the “effective distribution” in
order to arrive at a tax distribution system based on
multiple “patches”. These “patches” have been
growing in variety and size over the years since the
current law on co-participation was approved.
Late in 1999 the Federal Commitment was signed,
establishing a fixed sum for the year 2000 of 1,350
million pesos and a three-year average with a minimum
level of 1,364 million pesos as from 2001. Later, in
November 2000, another Federal Commitment was
signed between the national government and the
provinces under a new programme known as
“guaranteed cover”. This agreement replaced the
mobile averages with fixed sums for the following
years, until a new co-participation law was approved.
The macroeconomic and fiscal situation sharply
deteriorated from mid-2001 on. As from the third quarter
of that year, the difficulties in obtaining financing
obliged the national government to adopt a programme
aimed at achieving month-to-month fiscal stability
through a strict accounting rule called “zero deficit”. As
part of the same programme, the national government
negotiated with the provinces a “Second Addendum” to
the November 2000 Federal Commitment, providing for
a reduction in transfers of the order of 13%, and a
voluntary debt swap scheme was put into effect. From
then on, the different levels of government had serious
difficulties in fulfilling their obligations, and in various
jurisdictions serious delays in the payment of salaries
reappeared. Furthermore, the practice of paying
commitments with bonds spread rapidly, and a wide
variety of means of payment began to be used. The
failure of the “zero deficit” programme and an
accumulation of political and social factors resulted in
a profound political crisis which was reflected in the
removal from office of various ministerial teams.
4. Crisis and new circumstances
On 27 February 2002, after the end of convertibility,
the national government carried out a new round of
negotiations with the subnational levels of government
aimed at agreeing on new rules for the transfer of
resource to the provinces, the target deficit, and debt
renegotiation. These involved some basic commitments,
including the abandonment of fixed amounts of
transfers and their replacement with the coefficients
laid down in the current legislation, plus 30% of the
tax on credits and debits; the renegotiation of the
provinces’ debts with the aim of converting them into
debts in pesos; the establishment of a limit of 15% on
the allocation of co-participation resources for payment
of the service on the restructured debts; the reduction
of the fiscal deficit of the jurisdictions, and limitations
on provincial indebtedness.
Within the framework of this Federal Agreement,
the national government signed bilateral agreements
with some provinces. In 2002 agreements were signed
with 17 provinces, and in 2003 with 15 jurisdictions.
The Ministry of the Economy has signed what it calls
Orderly Financing Programmes with each of the
provinces, under which it provides them with finance
each month to cover the agreed financial deficits and
the debt service on the public debt for the current year.
The signing of the February 2002 agreement
enabled the provinces to improve their relative fiscal
position in two ways: first, through the return to the
system of automatic resource distribution by
coefficients which was in effect before the 1999 Fe-
deral Commitment, in a context of increases in price
levels (in 2002) and the product (in 2003), and second,
through the lower debt service payments due to the
debt swaps and the 15% limit placed on the allocation
of co-participation resources for debt service.
Consequently, with the aim of illustrating the
overall changes in fiscal policy resulting from the cri-
sis, it may be noted that there has been a considerable
fiscal improvement, basically for three reasons: the
smaller debt service payments, the lower level of
remunerations and social security benefits (both in real
terms and as a percentage of GDP), and the increase in
revenue due largely to the incorporation of windfall
resources only partially subject to co-participation
(export duties and the tax on cheques). This has made
possible a considerable improvement in the primary
results of all the levels of government and, hence,
somewhat greater leeway for increasing social
assistance expenditures designed to relieve the serious
social situation.
With regard to the level and structure of expenditure,
figure 1 (in section II.1 above) shows the changes in
the different levels of government after the end of the
convertibility programme and the subsequent crisis. If
we compare the data for 2000 and 2002, we see that
—apart from the decline in expenditure of all three
levels of government led by the reduction in public
debt interest payments (which went down by 40.4% at
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the national government level)— the only item which
registers an increase is that corresponding to “other
social expenditure” of the national government
(57.4%). This item includes the Unemployed Heads of
Household Programme. The remaining items of
expenditure were influenced by the sharp fall in real
public sector wages and in the real value of social
security benefits.
As a reflection of a speculative nature, perhaps
consideration could be given to the possibility of an
incipient process of recentralization of functions based
on three elements: i) the rescue of the provincial
governments by the central government, through the
renegotiation of the provinces’ debts with a ceiling on
the allocation of provincial resources, implies a transfer
of responsibilities to the national government; ii) the
introduction of assistance programmes for emergency
situations (in view of the structural characteristics of
the Argentine economy, the employment situation and
the limitations of social security) can only be
interpreted as a first step in a direction which will
undoubtedly become more evident in the years to come;
and iii) some programmes of the national government
are dealing with shortcomings that the budgets of the
provinces were not able to solve during the crisis. This
latter element is particularly evident in the public health
area, through the distribution of medicines (the “Re-
mediar” programme) or the allocation of transfers,
subject to the fulfillment of programme goals (along
the lines of counterpart donations), in order to finance
mother and child attention in the relatively less
developed provinces.
IV
Political conflict and institutional weaknesses
in the financial relations between the national
government and the provinces
Inevitably, many references have been made in this
article to the forms and magnitude of the underlying
political conflict in the relations between levels of
government in Argentina. In the opening sections we
mentioned the origins and development of these
tensions. We also referred to some aspects of these
conflicts during the last 15 years, in which
macroeconomic imbalances and the social security
crisis have been the clearest causes of the difficulties
in solving the problems pending in the financial
relations between the different levels of jurisdiction.
Our view is that the period under analysis was one
in which the national government exhausted all the
sources of financing other than the tax resources
subject to co-participation. The struggle among the
different levels of government, which occurred at a
time when there was a high level of political conflict
and macroeconomic crisis, has also been accompanied
by great institutional weaknesses in the field of
federalism. This has been at once a cause and a
consequence of the problems of the period in question.
As Bardhan (2001) notes, when institutional
weakness is the result of serious distributive conflicts,
this makes it difficult for both the national and local
levels of government to fulfill public policy objectives.
Out of the many manifestations of these weaknesses
in the federal organization of Argentina, we would like
to briefly refer to those which have been most obvious
during the last 15 years: the proliferation of emergency
agreements instead of stable resource distribution
systems, and the institutional weaknesses as regards
regulation of the indebtedness of the subnational levels
of government.
1. The proliferation of emergency agreements
instead of stable resource distribution
systems
A characteristic feature of the relations between the
national government and the provinces while Law No.
23.548 was in force is the predominance of the
relations between executive levels of authority over
what is laid down in the legislation. This is reflected
both in the emergency agreements between levels of
government to modify what is laid down in the relevant
legislation, and in the discretionary settlement of
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specific situations affecting some jurisdictions by the
national government. An extreme example of the
institutional tension which has prevailed in the relations
between jurisdictions, and which has run counter to the
parliamentary solutions arrived at after negotiations
between the executive authorities concerned, is the
requirement by the 1994 Constituent Assembly that a
new system of tax distribution should be negotiated and
agreed upon. This has never been complied with by the
executive authorities, however.
In the course of the period studied, various pacts
or agreements have been negotiated and signed to deal
with the many difficulties faced, ranging from the
financing of the social security system to the
renegotiation of the debt. All these involved agreements
between executive authorities which modified the
distribution of resources laid down in that co-
participation law.
In the previous section we mentioned the
multiplicity of makeshift solutions or patches which
have modified the system until it has reached its present
level of intricacy and irrationality. Many of these were
implemented through legislative changes, but others
—the most important— have given rise to legislative
changes after agreements between executive authorities.
Whenever this has happened it has left ample room for
a form of negotiation in which political aspects have
prevailed and elements have been incorporated which
have not always been clearly expressed.
As a result of these agreements, plus the many
changes made in the distribution of the different taxes
subject to co-participation, the distribution of resources
has become a chaotic set of varied ad hoc distribution
mechanisms which have been multiplying over the
years. The multiplicity of distribution mechanisms is
not a response to a similar multiplicity of objectives,
but is the result of a mass of conflicts and struggles.
According to the legislation, it should be a formula
based on a single distribution coefficient for all the
taxes subject to co-participation (or at least it should
allow very few exceptions, and even then only of a
temporary nature), but in fact it has become a complex
matrix linking those taxes with various different
objectives through percentages and fixed sums which
are a faithful reflection of the distributive struggle over
the public accounts.
Three basic forms of pressure on the distribution
system may be observed. First, there is the allocation
of co-participative resources proper in order, mostly,
to the need to provide more finance for the social
security system. Second, there is the allocation of those
resources to finance the infrastructure, historically from
taxes on hydrocarbons and energy. Finally, there are
the struggles for the distribution of resources within the
national budget. All this would appear to indicate that,
apart from the struggle between the national
government and the provinces, there are also sectoral
struggles which it is sought to solve through the
allocation of different taxes for specific purposes.
2. Institutional weaknesses as regards regulation
of the indebtedness of the subnational levels
of government
During the second half of the 1990s, successive
national policy decisions gave the provinces the
possibility of gaining easier access to internal and
external sources of finance. Since the credit market
situation was favourable to this change, there was a
considerable increase in the provinces’ indebtedness,
which reached a high point late in 2001.
During the 1990s the provinces’ indebtedness was
governed by a series of rules of different scope and
institutional origin.10 Most of the provinces had limits,
laid down in their own constitutions, on the permissible
level of indebtedness. These restrictions included
mechanisms for the authorization of indebtedness,
restrictions on the use of the funds thus obtained (for
example, the prohibition of their use to finance current
expenditure), or limitations on the level of debt
service.11
At the same time, there was also a set of
regulations on the indebtedness of the provinces in the
national legislation. The reform of the Charter of the
Central Bank of the Argentine Republic prohibited the
granting of credits from financial entities to the public
sector without the authorization of the Minister of the
Economy. Resolution 1075/93 of that Ministry laid
down that in the case of foreign-currency loans, the
provincial governments needed special approval for
operations with the financial system. This Resolution
also established an automatic debt service payment
mechanism through direct access to the co-participative
10 Article 124 of the National Constitution gives the provinces the
power to sign international agreements, subject to certain requisites,
stating that the provinces “can also sign international agreements
provided the latter are not incompatible with the foreign policy of
the Nation, do not affect the faculties delegated to the Federal
Government or the public credit of the Nation, and are signed with
the knowledge of the National Congress.”
11 For a detailed analysis of this subject, see Cetrángolo, Jiménez
and others (2002).
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resources deposited by the national government in the
accounts of provincial governments. This mechanism
facilitated access to the financial markets by the
provinces, by providing a reliable guarantee, but the
fact that it was not applied with the aim of ensuring
the financial solvency of the jurisdictions in question
encouraged over-indebtedness in some cases. Only
with the implementation of the Financial and Fiscal
Assistance Programme early in 2000 and the Orderly
Finance Programmes in 2002 was it possible for this
mechanism to be used in a group of provinces as an
effective means of limiting indebtedness in order to
comply with the reduction of imbalances agreed upon
between each provincial government and the national
government.
The indebtedness mechanism used by the
provinces since the early years of the 1990s, using the
transfers of co-participative resources as a guarantee,
has had two effects: on the one hand, it has encouraged
growing indebtedness of the provinces by facilitating
access to credit markets, while on the other, it has
sharply restricted the provision of social goods and
services by the provinces, by modifying the provincial
budgetary process. The provinces have lost their
capacity to establish budget priorities month by month,
since payment of creditors is carried out automatically;
consequently, they have to find additional finance to
cover their operating expenses in each period.
Table 4 shows the percentages of co-participation
resources allocated for debt payments in 2001, before
the cessation of payments. It clearly shows the very
limited budget leeway available to some provinces for
covering their operating expenses after paying the debt
TABLE 4
Argentina: Co-participation transfers
allocated to debt payment, 2001
























Santiago del Estero 36.6
Tucuman 85.3
Tierra del Fuego 37.9
Source: Prepared by the authors.
service. Subsequently, with the signing of the February
2002 agreement, a 15% limit was established for the
amount allocated to service renegotiated loans, with the
national government making itself responsible for
commitments over and above that percentage.
V
Final remarks
In this article we have shown that the problems
currently besetting the federal organization of Argen-
tina are the result of the juxtaposition of structural
problems, of the reforms made in the 1990s, and the
crisis which followed the end of convertibility. We
have emphasized the importance of taking into account
the political and institutional aspects of the problem,
which have been influenced by a combination of
elements in which institutional weakness is the
counterpart and reflection of a strong political struggle
about federal matters, whose origins may be traced
back to the formation of the Argentine nation.
The dynamics of the political and institutional
conflict have been further increased by the
characteristics of the prolonged macroeconomic crisis
which, with periods of greater or lesser tension, has
dominated Argentine history in recent decades. With
regard to the subject of this article, the dominant
features of the conflict have been the course of the
social security crisis and its growing needs for finance,
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and a tax structure which is insufficient to finance
properly the public policies that the different levels of
government are trying to carry out.
We have seen that as long as the national public
sector was able to obtain additional finance to cover
the new demands of public policies, the expansion of
government activities which accompanied the
development of Argentina did not enter into conflict
with the functioning of the federal system of the
country. But when the macroeconomic crisis got worse,
the sources of financing not subject to co-participation
(customs revenue, the inflation tax, fuel taxes, payroll
taxes, the social security surplus, indebtedness,
privatization operations) were exhausted, a fiscal cri-
sis broke out (impelled by indebtedness and the social
security crisis) and the conflict over the distribution of
the resources subject to co-participation became
increasingly serious and complex.
The exhaustion of sources of financing not subject
to co-participation for coping with the new functions
that the national government has had to assume, the
increase in the number of subnational jurisdictions
participating in the distribution of resources, and the
growing imbalance between outlays and resources
among the jurisdictions were structural factors which,
together with the typical characteristics of the last few
decades (crises at the macroeconomic level and in the
social security system and the ongoing political
struggle), explain the high level of conflict which has
dominated the financial relations between the national
government and the provinces.
In the 1990s an important role was played by
problems of another type, connected with the
implementation of a macroeconomic programme with
a fixed exchange rate, whose priority now needs to be
reviewed. The urgent need to improve the international
competitiveness of the tradeable goods sectors gave
rise to a debate on the reform of provincial taxes on
gross income, which were the main source of income
of their own for the provinces. While not denying the
importance of this matter, it is open to question whether
the degree of urgency assumed by this question at that
time continues today, now that the macroeconomic
programme provides for a very different configuration
of relative prices; nevertheless, work should be
continued on this matter, albeit without the degree of
urgency of that time.
Likewise, consensuses were reached in the 1990s
which must now be revised. Unfortunately, the
possibility of introducing a system with new
distribution criteria for increases in the amount of
revenue collected —an initiative which was widely
supported in those years— now calls for agreements
which are more difficult to reach: whether the levels
to be respected are nominal or real, and, at all events,
what price index to use.
It is worth noting that, in the light of the difficulty
in finding a solution for the problems deriving from
the absence of an explicit, stable and transparent
resource distribution mechanism, the expectations
raised by the constitutional commitment to agree on
a new system have led to pressures to incorporate in
that system —already difficult to agree on— new
items that make this exercise even more complex.
Thus, items have been added such as the new fiscal
institutions, the need to redefine and harmonize the
powers to levy taxes, the absence of fiscal rules, and
the development of instruments to soften the effects
of economic cycles.
There are, however, two structural problems
which, as already noted, represent a serious weakness
of the way the federal system functions in Argentina
but unfortunately have not been sufficiently debated:
the problems of financing compensatory social policies,
and the imbalances in the product between the different
provinces. In the first case, efforts should be made to
correct the shortcomings observed in the past process
of decentralization of social expenditure, especially in
the fields of health and basic education. Under the
pressure of urgent fiscal needs, the national government
finally lost interest in compensatory policies and those
aimed at coordinating social expenditure, with a
consequent heavy adverse impact on equity. In order
to solve these problems, it is necessary first of all to
design suitable sectoral policies, as was done in the
1990s in the field of education as is now being
discussed in the field of health. If these initiatives are
to be successful, however, the future system of
transfers must take these policies into account and
include their financial needs in the debate.
In the second case, there are big disparities in the
product of the different provinces. In view of the
enormous development gap observed between the
different provinces of Argentina, it cannot be imagined
that fiscal correspondence (i.e., that the subnational
governments should finance their expenditure from
their own resources) is the solution to problems of
incentives. It is unthinkable that the least developed
provinces could ensure a supply of public goods simi-
lar to that of the more highly developed provinces
without assistance from the national government (and
not only financial assistance). This in turn leads us to
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the problems of the promotion of production
development and the role of local governments.
It is also necessary to identify the problems that
will characterize the new economic situation. The end
of convertibility was accompanied by a reformulation
of the functions of the different levels of government.
There are four features which must be taken into
account in this respect:
— The changes in the tax structure, which have
played a significant part in achieving a conside-
rable primary surplus of tax resources not subject
to co-participation (customs revenue) or those
only subject to a low level of co-participation
(bank credits and debits).
— The growing importance of social assistance
expenditure in the national finances.
— The announcement of new changes in the social
security system.
— The process of debt renegotiation and the transfer
to the national government of much of the pro-
vincial debt burden.
It is hard to imagine a debate on a new system of
distribution between the national government and the
provinces which tries to arrive at a medium-term
agreement without first of all making a pronouncement
about the probability that these phenomena will persist
and that —as everything seems to indicate— the large
budget items earmarked, for example, for social
assistance12 and the new transfers to the provinces to
support the provision of public health services (the
“Remediar” and mother and child insurance
programmes) will be maintained in the future. If this
is so, then this will mean that we are witnessing a new
redistribution of functions which will require a new
examination of the questions of federalism and
transfers between the different levels of government.
The reformulation of the social security system, for its
part, may be associated with the introduction of social
assistance pensions for elderly persons who can not
provide proof of 30 years of formal employment. These
expenditures will undoubtedly grow and will have to
be paid by the national government.
Another element which we should not forget
concerns the functioning of the macroeconomic level
in coming years and its impact on the finances of the
different levels of government. The particular fiscal
situation prevailing today is supported by a set of
relative prices in which the high exchange rate makes
it possible to collect some windfall taxes not subject
to co-participation, while the fall in public sector wages
and social security benefits in real terms has made
possible a considerable fiscal surplus (as well as
financing new functions). The exceptional nature of
this situation makes it necessary to be very careful
about introducing new resource distribution rules
which may be affected in the near future.
In recent months, however, the debate on a
possible co-participation law has been resumed and the
possibility of effectively achieving this has been
discussed. Bearing in mind the analogy frequently
drawn between the current distribution system and a
labyrinth, in some cases the well-known phrase of
Leopoldo Marechal seems to have been resorted to in
order to try to find a new magic way out: “all labyrinths
have a way out upward”.13
The new situation requires a flexible form of
federalism which meets the different demands of each
province and can be adapted to the changing
circumstances of the Argentine economy. It is not
necessary to seek an instrument which tries to solve
all the problems at once. It would be advisable, instead,
to discuss, agree upon and implement different
solutions for specific problems which, in time, can
clear the way for the solution of problems that are
harder to tackle. The construction of a modern form
of federalism is a task that must be continued every
day, and the approval of some particular law cannot
magically solve long-standing problems.
(Original: Spanish)
12 Especially the Unemployed Heads of Household Programme. 13 “Laberinto de amor”, a poem published by Sur in 1944.
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